http://www.theweekmagazine.com/briefing.asp?a_id=379
The Kurds’ quest
The Kurds are one of three major ethnic groups expected to inherit postwar Iraq. Will their quest for autonomy plunge the region into greater turmoil?
Who are the Kurds?
The Kurds are tribal groups living primarily in a sprawling mountainous region that lies inside the borders of Iraq, Iran, and Turkey. The 25 million Kurds are the largest ethnic group in the world without a homeland. Although they consider themselves distinct from Arabs and Turks, they are probably descendants of ancient Arab and Turkoman tribes. About 12 million live in Turkey, 6 million in Iran, and about 3.5 million in northern Iraq, with the rest scattered throughout the Caucasus. Most are Sunni Muslim and speak various dialects of Kurdish. After centuries of conflict with other peoples, the Kurds have a strong cultural identity and a strong suspicion of outsiders; they describe themselves as a people with “no friends but the mountains.”
Why don’t they have a country?
For more than 2,000 years, their homelands have been ruled by a succession of dynasties and nations. The Kurds have resisted this domination, often fiercely, but have also feuded among themselves and been repeatedly betrayed by world powers claiming to have their interests at heart. “They’ve been fairly regularly screwed throughout history,” says Larry P. Goodson, director of Middle East studies at the U.S. Army War College. Every foreign power who’s meddled in the region, he says, has followed this rule: “Make sure you screw the Kurds at least once.” The Arabs were among the first to take their turn, back in the sixth century B.C., and were followed by the Persians, Greeks, Macedonians, Armenians, Romans, and Byzantines. In the 11th century, the Ottoman Turks took over; their rule lasted until World War I. After the war, the Europeans decided to redraw the map of the Mideast.
Where did that leave the Kurds?
Mostly, in a new nation called Turkey. In 1932, the southern portion of the Kurdish lands was enclosed within a new nation called Iraq, whose borders were drawn by the British.
How did the Kurds react?
With periodic, violent uprisings against both their Turkish and Iraqi rulers. The rebellions were squelched, though for a brief time in the 1970s, Kurdish resistance leaders thought they had America’s support. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger promised them $16 million to bankroll a revolt against Saddam Hussein. But the offer was all part of a geopolitical chess game involving the U.S., Iraq, and the Shah of Iran. After secret negotiations, Saddam ceded some disputed land to the Shah, a U.S. ally. Kissinger then withdrew American support from the Kurds, and Saddam crushed the Kurdish uprising. When U.S. intelligence agents protested this bit of realpolitik, Kissinger remarked, “Covert action should not be confused with missionary work.”
Did the Kurds give up?
No. When Iraq and Iran went to war in the 1980s, the Kurds seized the chance to rebel again. This time, Saddam decided to rid himself of the Kurdish resistance once and for all. First, he sent in troops to flatten Kurdish villages. Then his cousin Gen. Ali Hasan al Majid—nicknamed “Chemical Ali”—directed the Iraqi air force to drop mustard gas, nerve gas, and other chemical weapons on about 200 Kurdish villages. The single most deadly attack occurred in Halabja in March 1988; in just a few minutes, deadly chemicals wiped out 5,000 men, women, and children. When Saddam’s genocidal campaign was over, about 200,000 Kurds were dead.
Did this campaign succeed?
It only left the Kurds more determined to fight Saddam. In the Gulf War’s final stage, they heeded President George H.W. Bush’s call to the Iraqi people to rise up, and Kurdish fighters took over the entire north of Iraq. Their success, though, alarmed Turkey, which feared Turkish Kurds would be tempted to join their Iraqi cousins in forming a Kurdish state. With Turkey threatening to go to war against the Kurds, Bush decided not to help the Kurds when Saddam once again sought to punish them. As the U.S. stood by, Saddam sent in his helicopters and gunned down about 20,000 Kurds; about 2 million Kurds fled their homes. Only then did the U.S. and Britain establish a no-fly zone in northern Iraq, to prevent Saddam from inflicting any more damage.
Was the no-fly zone effective?
Yes. Under the protection of U.S. warplanes, the Kurds have enjoyed relative peace and security for 12 years. Though they still do not have a formal nation, there is an autonomous Kurdish government, with an elected parliament. The two main parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, fight frequently, but have so far managed to work together. Their stated goal is not independence but a role in a federalist Iraqi state. Some admit this is a temporary strategy designed to please the West. Sooner or later, says Rashid Karadaghi, a Kurdish columnist, his people will seek a state of their own. “Kurdish land is not Arab land, it is not Turkish land, it is not Persian land,” he says. “It is Kurdish land.”
What do the Turks think?
Sentiments like those deeply worry the Turks. Turkey already has several thousand troops stationed in northern Iraq to defend its border and keep its Kurdish population from getting any ideas. So far, the U.S. has been able to keep the Turks from sending more troops into Iraq. But that could change if the Turks feel threatened. A worst-case scenario would see a new war break out between Turkey and the Kurds, with U.S. troops in the middle. “The bottom line,” says Mensur Akgun of the Turkish Social and Economic Studies Foundation, “is that the Turks will do whatever they can to hinder the development of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq.”
The Kurd named Saladin
Saddam Hussein would like to go down in history as a latter-day Saladin, the 12th-century warrior who fought and defeated the Christian crusaders. The two have appeared side by side on postage stamps and in a children’s book, and in one biography Saddam is quoted as saying, “By God, I do indeed dream and wish for this.” Saddam’s glorification of Saladin as the ultimate Arab warrior, however, neglects to mention certain salient facts. One is that Saladin was a Kurd—the very same ethnic group against whom Saddam has waged a genocidal campaign. The other is that Saladin, though a determined warrior, was a merciful man known among the crusaders as the “good enemy,” more chivalrous than his Christian counterpart, Richard the Lionhearted. After winning the battle for Jerusalem, Saladin allowed defeated Christians to go home, rather than slaughter them. In 1190, he issued a manifesto inviting Jews from all over the world to settle in Jerusalem.
http://www.theweekmagazine.com/briefing.asp?a_id=407
The growing power of the Shiites
Iraq’s Shiite majority, brutally oppressed under Saddam Hussein, will play a major role in determining the future of Iraq. Will they turn Iraq into an Islamic state?
Who are the Shiites?
They comprise the second largest branch of Islam (after the Sunnis), accounting for 10 percent to 15 percent of all Muslims. Shiites are a minority in all Muslim countries except Azerbaijan, Yemen, Iran, and Iraq, where they make up around 60 percent of the population.
How did Shiite Islam come about?
As the result of succession disputes after the death of the Prophet Mohammed in 632. Most of Mohammed’s followers accepted that the Islamic community should be led by an elected caliph. But the Shiites believed that the succession should follow a “divinely appointed” hereditary line, starting with Mohammed’s son-in-law Ali (the word “Shiite” comes from the Arabic “shiat Ali,” meaning “the partisans of Ali”). Ali was the first Shiite imam, and his tomb, in the Iraqi city of Najaf, is one of the holiest places in Shiite Islam. But possibly the most significant figure in Shiite history is Ali’s younger son Husayn, the third imam.
Why is Husayn so important?
Because his martyrdom, more than any other single event, created the unique consciousness of Shiite Islam. In 680, Shiite Muslims in Kufa (now part of Iraq) asked Husayn to liberate them from the oppressive rule of Yazid, the sixth Sunni caliph. Husayn rode to the plain of Karbala, where he was intercepted by an army of 5,000 soldiers and ordered to swear fealty to Yazid. Although he had only 72 soldiers, he refused, and he and his men were massacred. His son survived to continue the line. The annual festival of Ashura commemorates Husayn’s valor, while also expressing the collective guilt of the Shiites, who asked Husayn to come to their rescue but failed to help him in his hour of need. The atmosphere is one of grief and atonement, with processions of devout Shiites flagellating themselves with chains and razors. Husayn’s martyrdom inscribed in the Shiite mind the idea that one must be prepared to suffer, and even die, for the true faith.
Is the hereditary line still going?
No. The line of descent through Ali and Husayn became extinct in 939, when the 4-year-old 12th imam, al-Askari, disappeared within days of inheriting the title. The Shiites refused to accept that he had died, preferring to believe that he was merely “hidden” and would one day reappear on earth as the Mahdi (a messianic figure who will make the world perfect before Judgment Day). The majority of Shiites, who call themselves “Twelvers,” still adhere to this belief. But in the absence of a hereditary line, spiritual power was eventually transferred to the ulema, a council of 12 scholars trusted to elect a “supreme imam.” The most famous in modern times was Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini.
How politicized are the Shiites?
The Shiites survived a long history of persecution by keeping a low profile and avoiding politics, but in recent decades they have become more politicized. Since the Iranian revolution in 1979, led by Khomeini, Shiite ideology has become more outward-looking and pan-Islamic. Iranian clerics preach that Islam should be a tool for the empowerment of the oppressed, not merely a set of devotional practices. Hence Iran’s support for the Palestinian, Afghan, and Lebanese causes. The guerrilla group Hezbollah is a Shiite organization.
What about the Shiites in Iraq?
Under Saddam Hussein, the Shiite majority was brutally oppressed. Shiite holy places were desecrated and many of their leaders were murdered or forced to flee to Iran. Even Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr—the man appointed by Saddam as the head of the Shiite community—was executed once he became too influential. His successor, the current Grand Ayatollah Sayyed Ali al-Sistani, was kept under house arrest for 15 years. Many of today’s Shiite leaders are the sons of murdered religious figures.
And now that Saddam is gone?
Initial Shiite jubilance at Saddam’s downfall has given way to alarm at the prospect of a U.S. occupation. There is a strong historical strain of anti-imperialism within Shiism, and Iraqi Shiites are already challenging any future U.S.-led administrations by taking care of business themselves: organizing local committees, doling out funds to pay public servants, retrieving looted property, and sending militias to secure government buildings. In the long term, Iraqi Shiites are divided about what style of government should come next. Some Shiites want an Iranian-style theocracy, but many others are “quietists” who believe in the separation of religion and state. Ayatollah al-Sistani espouses the latter approach. Early in the U.S. invasion of Iraq, he advised Shiites not to support either side. But his refusal to get involved with politics has left the field open for more radicalized clerics to gain power.
What kind of men are these?
Prominent among them is Seyed Muqtada al-Sadr, whose father, a much-loved Shiite ayatollah, was murdered by Saddam’s regime in 1999. Al-Sadr has apparently put together his own militia, the Jammat-i-Sadr-Than. Recently, 50 fighters linked to him besieged al-Sistani in his home for four days, demanding that he leave Iraq. Al-Sistani called tribal leaders to his aid and the siege was lifted. Another powerful Shiite figure is Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim—the cleric who recently returned from exile in Iran to a rapturous welcome.
Might there be an Islamic revolution?
Most Iraqi Shiites want democracy, not theocracy. They are aware that the revolution in Iran delivered neither prosperity nor sanctity—and besides, there is no Iraqi leader with the charisma of Khomeini. Indeed, some observers believe that Iraq could become a moderating influence on global Shiism, providing an alternative center of gravity to Iran. Najaf is home to the oldest Shiite seminary, established more than 1,300 years ago. Shiite theologians—especially those who don’t accept the Iranian model—will inevitably flock to a Najaf freed from tyranny. Thousands of teachers and students—as well as several ayatollahs—are talking about moving there from Iran.
The Shiite tradition
Sunni and Shiite Islam are as different as Catholicism and Protestantism within Christianity. Shiism has more in common with Catholicism. The supreme imam is imbued with popelike infallibility, and the Shiite religious hierarchy is not unlike that of the Catholic Church. Sunnis, by contrast, do not have a formal clergy—just scholars and jurists who may offer nonbinding opinions on Islamic law and traditions. Shiism also has a more mystical tradition than Sunnism (hence the belief in the hidden imam), and puts much more emphasis on the injustice of the world—Shiite tradition is full of martyrs and heroic deeds. Shiite laws on divorce and inheritance are more favorable to women—supposedly a reflection of the high esteem in which Fatima, the wife of Ali and the daughter of Mohammed, is held.
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