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17. Author: JTokash Date: 02/07/2008 04:36 PM Reply
And I quote (http://boinc.berkeley.edu/trac/wiki/SecurityIssues):
"Malicious executable distribution
BOINC uses code signing to prevent this. Each project has a key pair for code signing. The private key should be kept on a network-isolated machine used for generating digital signatures for executables. The public key is distributed to, and stored on, clients. All files associated with application versions are sent with digital signatures using this key pair.
Even if attackers break into a project's BOINC servers, they will not be able to cause clients to accept a false code file.
BOINC provides a mechanism by which projects can periodically change their code-signing key pair. The project generates a new key pair, then (using the code-signing machine) generates a signature for the new public key, signed with the old private key. The core client will accept a new key only if it's signed with the old key. This mechanism is designed to prevent attackers from breaking into a BOINC server and distributing a false key."
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The key pairs only prevent someone from hijacking the BOINC distributed code and replacing with their own.
The compromise could easily originate or be placed inside the code prior to key pair generation, in which case it would be distributed as authentic.
The BOINC lsf executable itself is whole 'nother can of worms.