Dr. Pepperhill:
Ok, here's where I ask, one more time: "have you read the Duelfer report?"
Here's a few snippets:
"Iraq was successful in procuring, constructing, and
commissioning a complete state-of-the-art chemical
facility for ammonium perchlorate through the
Indian company NEC. Ammonium perchlorate is a
key chemical for missile propellants."
"Iraq began refurbishing, and in some cases expanding,
existing chemical facilities with foreign assistance.
For example, the Al Tariq complex renovated
its chlorine and phenol lines and restarted them in
March 2000, according to reporting."
"Reports of an unexplained discovery of VX traces
on missile warhead fragments in April 1997 led to
further tension between UNSCOM and Iraq. The
uneasy relationship escalated with the discovery of
the ‘Air Force Document’ (see RSI chapter) in July
1998, which indicated further Iraqi deception and
obfuscation over its CW disclosures. Iraq’s anger
about these two major issues was a contributing
factor to Saddam’s decisions to suspend cooperation
with UNSCOM and IAEA."
"Of the approximately 200 former CW scientists—
about 60 of whom are considered key CW experts
from the Al Muthanna years—ISG attempted to
contact close to 150 to determine their activities
since 1991 and any efforts by the Regime to utilize
their skills for CW-related efforts. ISG was able to
identify initial location information for approximately
130 individuals, many of whom were not able to
contacted. Based on locations, employment, and availability, ISG experts were able to speak to nearly 30 former key-CW scientists..."
"Imad Husayn al Ani, Iraq’s former program director
for VX, stated in an interview in 2003 that plans to
produce thiourea and DCC, both of which he was
unaware, indicated unequivocally that the Regime
intended to reconstitute the V-series nerve agent
program."
"ISG judges that the longstanding intent of the
Regime was to restart WMD production once UN
sanctions were lifted. Based on an investigation of
facilities, materials, and production outputs, ISG
also judges that Iraq had a break-out capability
to produce large quantities of sulfur mustard CW
agent, but not nerve agents."
"Mustard production could have started within days
if the necessary precursor chemicals were colocated
in a suitable production facility; otherwise
production could have started within weeks."
"Figure 3 shows a two-ton bulk storage cylinder found
in the underground pilot plant at Al Muthanna. The
storage container had been modifi ed in the 1980s into
a reactor vessel probably for mustard production. This
item escaped UNSCOM-directed destruction."
"Since May 2004, ISG has recovered dozens of
additional chemical munitions, including artillery
rounds, rockets and a binary Sarin artillery projectile
(see Figure 5). In each case, the recovered munitions
appear to have been part of the pre-1991 Gulf war
stocks, but we can neither determine if the munitions
were declared to the UN or if, as required by the UN
SCR 687, Iraq attempted to destroy them. (See Annex
F.)"
"A group of insurgents began a nascent CW effort
without CW scientists or industrial-scale chemical
supplies. After OIF, a group of insurgents—referred
to as the al-Abud network—assembled key supplies
and relevant expertise from community resources to
develop a program for weaponizing CW agents for
use against Coalition Forces. The al-Abud network in
late 2003 recruited a Baghdad chemist—who lacked
the relevant CW expertise—to develop chemical
agents. The group sought and easily acquired from
farmers and local shops chemicals and equipment to
conduct CW experiments. An investigation of these
CW attempts suggests that the al-Abud network failed
to produce desired CW agents, however it remains
unclear whether these failures derive from a lack of
available precursors or insufficient CW expertise."
But hey, you keep on quoting CNN.