Finally, state enforcement of Section 3 with respect to the
Presidency would raise heightened concerns. “[I]n the con
text of a Presidential election, state-imposed restrictions
implicate a uniquely important national interest.” Ander
son v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780, 794–795 (1983) (footnote
omitted). But state-by-state resolution of the question
whether Section 3 bars a particular candidate for President
from serving would be quite unlikely to yield a uniform an
swer consistent with the basic principle that “the President
. . . represent[s] all the voters in the Nation.” Id., at 795
(emphasis added).
Conflicting state outcomes concerning the same candi
date could result not just from differing views of the merits,
but from variations in state law governing the proceedings
that are necessary to make Section 3 disqualification deter
minations. Some States might allow a Section 3 challenge
to succeed based on a preponderance of the evidence, while
12
TRUMP v. ANDERSON
Per Curiam
others might require a heightened showing. Certain evi
dence (like the congressional Report on which the lower
courts relied here) might be admissible in some States but
inadmissible hearsay in others. Disqualification might be
possible only through criminal prosecution, as opposed to
expedited civil proceedings, in particular States. Indeed, in
some States—unlike Colorado (or Maine, where the secre
tary of state recently issued an order excluding former Pres
ident Trump from the primary ballot)—procedures for ex
cluding an ineligible candidate from the ballot may not
exist at all. The result could well be that a single candidate
would be declared ineligible in some States, but not others,
based on the same conduct (and perhaps even the same fac
tual record).
The “patchwork” that would likely result from state enforcement
would “sever the direct link that the Framers
found so critical between the National Government and the
people of the United States” as a whole. U. S. Term Limits,
514 U. S., at 822. But in a Presidential election “the impact
of the votes cast in each State is affected by the votes cast”—
or, in this case, the votes not allowed to be cast—“for the
various candidates in other States.” Anderson, 460 U. S.,
at 795. An evolving electoral map could dramatically
change the behavior of voters, parties, and States across the
country, in different ways and at different times. The dis
ruption would be all the more acute—and could nullify the
votes of millions and change the election result—if Section
3 enforcement were attempted after the Nation has voted.
Nothing in the Constitution requires that we endure such
chaos—arriving at any time or different times, up to and
perhaps beyond the Inauguration.
*
*
*
For the reasons given, responsibility for enforcing Section
3 against federal officeholders and candidates rests with
Congress and not the States. The judgment of the Colorado
Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024)
Per Curiam
Supreme Court therefore cannot stand.
DONALD J. TRUMP, PETITIONER v. NORMA ANDERSON, ET AL. page 12-13 wrote:
